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Abstract
This paper argues that common intuitions regarding a) the specialness of
‘use-novel’ data for confirmation, and b) that this specialness implies the ‘no-
double-counting rule’, which says that data used in ‘constructing’ (calibrating)
a model cannot also play a role in confirming the model’s predictions, are
too crude. The intuitions in question are pertinent in all the sciences, but
we appeal to a climate science case study to illustrate what is at stake. Our
strategy is to analyse the intuitive claims in light of prominent accounts of
confirmation of model predictions. We show that, on the Bayesian account of
confirmation, and also on the standard Classical hypothesis-testing account,
claims a) and b) are not generally true, but for some select cases, it is possible
to distinguish data used for calibration from use-novel data, where only the
latter confirm. The more specialised Classical model-selection methods, on the
other hand, uphold a nuanced version of claim a), but this comes apart from b),
which must be rejected in favour of a more refined account of the relationship
between calibration and confirmation. Thus, depending on the framework of
confirmation, either the scope or the simplicity of the intuitive position must
be revised.
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1 Introduction
Scientists and philosophers alike have the intuition that the empirical fit of a model
or theory, i.e. how well the theory accords with relevant data, has lesser significance
for the predictive reliability or truth of the theory, to the extent that the theory
was designed to accommodate the data in question. For example, empirical fit with
observed retrogressions of planets was considered less indicative of the reliability of
Ptolemy’s theory, as compared to Copernicus’s theory, given that the former, as op-
posed to the latter, was refined specifically to account for the observational data
about retrogressions (cf. Lakatos and Zahar 1976). The puzzle arises, however, as to
whether these intuitions are vindicated by a plausible account of confirmation, and,
if so, how any such account explains the differential power of predicted (and thus
use-novel) as opposed to accommodated data in giving support to, or in other words,
confirming, the reliability of a theory.
John Worrall (2010) goes a long way towards meeting this challenge.1 Rather
than appealing to broad psychological tendencies amongst scientists, or to properties
of data, such as time of discovery, that surely do not have a direct bearing on con-
firmation, Worrall offers an account of use-novelty that rests on the relationship, in
terms of actual empirical content, between theory and data (cf. Musgrave’s (1974)
distinction between logical and historical theories of confirmation). Worrall casts
1Note that the main claims are already articulated in Worrall (1985; 1989); see also Worrall
(2002; 2006). The position is further clarified in Worrall (2014).
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use-novelty as turning on whether data is used to settle on a specific version of a gen-
eral theory, or in other words, whether data is used to settle the free parameters of a
general (or base) theory. Data that is not used to settle free parameters is predicted
data as opposed to accommodated data, and thus when it comes to confirmation,
such data is use-novel.
The significance of use-novelty for Worrall is summed up in his ‘no-double-counting’
rule, which effectively says that data used in settling the free parameters of a general
theory cannot play a role in adding support or incrementally confirming the theory’s
truth/reliability. More precisely, while data used to fix free parameters provides
support for the resulting version (or instance) of a general theory relative to other
versions that fit the data less well, this support does not ‘spread’ to the general the-
ory itself. In other words, data used to fix free parameters provides support for the
calibrated theory conditional on the general theory being correct, but this data does
not provide unconditional support for the calibrated (or the general) theory. This
account provides an effective way of conceiving the difference between, for instance,
the Copernican and Ptolemaic theories, vis-a`-vis the observational data about retro-
gressions; in the case of the Ptolemaic theory, the data is used to settle on a specific
instance of the theory that can fit the data about retrogressions, while it follows from
the basic geometry of the Copernican theory that there are retrogressions, and hence
there is a qualitative fit to the data about retrogressions without further refinements
of the Copernican theory (Lakatos and Zahar 1976). Intuitively, there is no confir-
mation of the general Ptolemaic theory in this case (albeit confirmation of a specific
version of Ptolemaic theory relative to others), while there is indeed confirmation
of the general Copernican theory. Furthermore, given the emphasis on incremen-
tal rather than absolute confirmation, Worrall’s account succeeds in explaining the
differing standing of theories constructed to accommodate data. While neither the
Ptolemaic theory nor, say, various Intelligent Design theories are incrementally con-
firmed by data used to construct or calibrate them, the former is simply more credible
from the outset, since the basic form of the Ptolemaic theory, unlike Intelligent De-
sign, is supported by other data and also by theoretical considerations.
This paper examines the cogency of Worrall’s account when it is applied broadly.
Calibration is a widespread phenomenon in science, and the question is whether
Worrall’s overarching maxims concerning calibration and confirmation are them-
selves plausible across a diversity of cases. While intuitively appealing to scientists
and philosophers alike, does Worrall’s account of use-novelty and his associated no-
double-counting rule (henceforth ‘the intuitive position’) make sense in the full range
of confirmation contexts?
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We appeal to a case study from climate science, illustrative of the more standard
model-building problem in science, as the platform from which to examine Worrall’s
claims. This case study is outlined in Section 2 below. Subsequent sections assess
the intuitive position in light of prominent accounts of evidence and confirmation.
Our primary goal is to challenge intuitions about use-novelty and its significance for
confirmation by exposing just how varied are the stances of prominent theories of con-
firmation on this issue. Others have critiqued Worrall’s claims about use-novelty from
the perspective of one or another theory of confirmation: Notably, Howson (1988),
Steele & Werndl (2013) and Schurz (2014) give more or less charitable Bayesian cri-
tiques of Worrall’s claims, Mayo (e.g., 1991, 2014) compares Worrall’s views with
the tenets of ‘severe testing’, and Hitchcock and Sober (2004) evaluate Worrall’s
claims by appeal to the standards of model-selection theory. We cite this work where
relevant in our discussion below. The importance of our contribution here is the
comparative treatment of different theories of confirmation. We show that intuitions
about use-novelty such as Worrall’s do not clearly favour any particular theory of
confirmation. This is not intended as an argument for pluralism about confirmation;
it is, more modestly, an argument for caution in assessing the normative significance
of intuitions about confirmation.
Following the presentation of our case study, the paper proceeds as follows: Sec-
tion 3 considers the Bayesian perspective, and shows why it does not generally uphold
the intuitive position, despite permitting a distinction between data for calibration
and use-novel, confirming data in certain types of cases. Section 4 presents the sim-
plest Classical approach to assessing models—the hypothesis-testing method, which
is shown to be very similar to the Bayesian method when it comes to use-novelty and
double-counting. Section 5 turns to the more specialised Classical model-selection
methods. These methods affirm the specialness of use-novelty, or at least, they ex-
plicitly account for the related danger of over-fitting models to data, and so partially
conform to the intuitive position, but they do not uphold the link between use-novelty
and no-double-counting. We return to the climate case study in Section 6, drawing
attention to the dilemma posed in the paper for extending and reforming the intuitive
position.
2 A climate case study
Willet et al. (2007) are concerned with explaining the increase of surface specific hu-
midity (the mass of water vapour in a unit mass of most air) in the past decades.
More specifically, they compare the performance of two base models as an explanation
of this trend. The first base model M1 is the third Hadley Centre Coupled Model
with a linear combination of anthropocentric forcings and natural forcings. The sec-
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ond base model M2 is the third Hadley Centre Coupled Model where only natural
forcings are considered.
There is a specific spatio-temporal pattern of change (a fingerprint) associated
with the anthropocentric forcings and a specific spatio-temporal pattern of change
associated with the natural forcings. While this fingerprint is given, what is not
known is the extent of the response to the forcings. Thus the extent of the response
corresponds to free parameters in the models that have to be estimated from the
data. That is, in the case of base model M1 there are two free parameters (one that
measures the extent of the response to the anthropocentric forcings and one that
measures the extent of the response to the natural forcings), and model instances of
M1 are obtained when the two parameters are assigned specific values. For model
M2 there is only one free parameter (that measures the extent of the response to
the natural forcings) and, again, model instances of M2 are obtained when the free
parameter is assigned a specific value.
Willet et al’s data consist of observations of surface relative humidity changes
from 1973-2003. The squared distance between simulations and observations is used
to measure the fit of the observations with the model instances. Now Willet et al.
first use the data about surface humidity to estimate the parameter values of M1.
The best estimates for the extent of the anthropocentric forcing and natural forcing,
respectively, are (1.12, 2.22). The 95% confidence intervals that Willet et al. also
report reveal that both parameter values are significantly different from zero. From
this Willet et al. conclude that none of the model instances of M2 provides a satis-
factory fit with the data about relative humidity and thus that the base model M1 is
confirmed relative to the base model M2. They also emphasise that this is the first
demonstration that specific humidity trends can only be explained with both natural
and anthropocentric forcings.
To sum up, Willet et al. use data about surface relative humidity to estimate the
values of the free parameters (calibration). At the same time, they use the same
data to confirm base model M1 relative to base model M2. Philosophers as well as
climate scientists have often debated whether such a procedure is legitimate. More
specifically, first, one question is whether data have to be use-novel, i.e. whether
data can only be used for confirmation if they have not already been used before
for calibrating the free parameters. A second and related question is whether it is
permissible to use the same data both for calibration and confirmation (in this case
one says that there is double-counting). Note that it is just an accidental feature of
the base models in the case study that they are nested base models. The questions
of use-novelty and double-counting arise whenever two base models are compared,
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whether they are nested base models or not. Indeed, in the next section we will
compare two base models M and N that are not nested.
3 The Bayesian method vis-a`-vis intuitions
This section focuses on what Bayesian logic of confirmation and evidence has to
say about the questions of use-novelty and double-counting posed above. For the
Bayesian, what is at issue for model confirmation is the truth of a proposition, in
this case a hypothesis describing the model prediction(s). The extent of confirmation
of the truth of the hypothesis is measured in terms of probability. Typically, the
Bayesian is interested in the change in the probability of the truth of a hypothesis
due to new data, i.e. incremental confirmation.
For ease of exposition and because it permits a clearer analysis, we will shortly
introduce illustrative models that are simpler than those employed in the climate
science case study. We will see that, while the Bayesian framework permits a formal
depiction of calibration very much in line with Worrall’s account, it does not vindi-
cate the intuitive position in its general form (cf. Steele and Werndl 2013). Having
said that, something of the position can be salvaged for a restricted set of cases.
Consider the following two base models:
M : z(x, y) = a · x+ b · y + c+N(0, σ)
N : z(x, y) = d · x+ e · y2 + f +N(0, σ).
Here σ is given; it is the standard deviation for the Gaussian error term. On the
other hand, a, b, c, d, e and f are uncertain, with each assumed to be in the range
−10 . . . 10. (For simplicity of exposition, we restrict our attention to the discrete case
where the uncertain parameters may take only values from a finite set within this
range.)
In line with Worrall’s account of calibration, the Bayesian treats a base model as a
set of fully specified model hypotheses, one hypothesis for each possible instantiation
of the base model, or in other words, one hypothesis for each possible combination
of free-parameter values for the base model. For our example, assume that each of
these model-instance hypotheses claims to give the value of z that would be observed
in the real world, or rather a probability distribution for the observed z. Note that
the probabilistic error term may account for observational error, i.e. the discrepancy
between the true value of z, as predicted by the model, and the observed z. It may
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otherwise account for model structural error in predicting the true value of z.
For the case we are considering, there are two base models, M and N , correspond-
ing to two sets of model-instance hypotheses, which may be labelled Ma,b,c, and Nd,e,f ,
where the subscripts indicate the values of the parameters for the model instance in
question. The scientist’s initial assessment of the truth of the various hypotheses is
represented by a prior probability distribution over these hypotheses. (In fact, the
prior probability distribution extends to all propositions in the domain, a Boolean
algebra, including all hypotheses and potential evidence.)
For the Bayesian, calibration is not really distinct from confirmation. When new
data is learnt, the relevant evidence proposition is effectively assigned probability one,
and the probabilities for all other propositions in the domain are updated according
to the Bayesian rule of conditionalisation. This rule can be stated in terms of a
ratio of the new probabilities, Prnew, of any proposition H relative to some other
proposition H ′, where E is the evidence or the data learnt, and Pr is the initial or
prior probability distribution:
Prnew(H)
Prnew(H ′)
=
Pr(H|E)
Pr(H ′|E) =
Pr(E|H)
Pr(E|H ′) ·
Pr(H)
Pr(H ′)
. (1)
The term Pr(E|H)
Pr(E|H′) is referred as the likelihood ratio. If this term in greater than
one, then H is more incrementally confirmed than H ′ by evidence E. If it is less
than one, then H is disconfirmed relative to H ′, and if it is equal to one, then H is
neither confirmed nor disconfirmed relative to H ′. Calibration may be understood as
a specific aspect of this probability updating due to new evidence: the updating of
the probabilities for the model-instance hypotheses associated with each base model.
For instance, assume that for base model M , the prior probabilities, Pr, for model
instances are equal. Now we learn new data. Then the ratio of probabilities, Prnew,
for the model instances of M is given by:
Prnew(Ma,b,c)
Prnew(Md,e,f )
=
Pr(Ma,b,c|E)
Pr(Md,e,f |E) =
Pr(E|Ma,b,c)
Pr(E|Md,e,f ) · 1. (2)
The above describes the calibration of base model M in light of new data E, as-
suming the prior probabilities for the model-instance hypotheses are equal.
In Steele and Werndl (2013), we showed why the Bayesian framework does not
generally accord a special role for use-novel data, and that the no-double-counting
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rule does not generally hold (for a similar underlying analysis, see Howson 1988). In
short, all data should be used for calibration, or in other words, the probabilities for
model-instance hypotheses should be updated in light of all new data. Moreover,
it is logically possible that calibration in this sense also coincides with incremen-
tal confirmation of a base model relative to another (set of) base model(s). This
will occur when the likelihood ratio for the base model relative to the other (set of)
base model(s) is positive. Note that the likelihood for any set of hypotheses (e.g. a
base model or set of base models) depends on both the likelihoods of the individual
hypotheses in the set, and the prior probabilities for these individual hypotheses,
conditional on the set being true. Note also that, as discussed in detail in Steele
and Werndl (2013) the points about use-novelty and double-counting carry over to
non-comparative confirmation, i.e. when the concern is not the comparison between
two base models but whether a base model is confirmed by the data tout court.
The intuitive position on use-novelty and double-counting clearly does not ac-
cord with the logical possibilities of Bayesian confirmation. One might nonetheless
argue that the Bayesian approach does capture the spirit of the intuitive position,
at least for a restricted set of cases. These special cases may indeed have been the
original impetus for the intuitive position; they are cases of deterministic rather than
indeterministic/stochastic hypotheses. The base models M and N stated above both
describe sets of stochastic hypotheses, due to the probabilistic error term for each. As
such, none of the model-instance hypotheses, i.e. the instances of these base models,
can ever be falsified; calibration is rather an ongoing process whereby model-instance
hypotheses are continually updated in light of new data. For a deterministic base
model, by contrast, calibration may come to an end when only one instance of a
base model remains unfalsified. This permits a distinction between data needed for
calibration and use-novel data that may bear on the truth of a base model once
calibration has finished.2 For cases where there is a certain symmetry in the prior
probability distribution (specifically, where the likelihood of the calibrating data is
the same for all base models under consideration), it may moreover be true that the
data used for calibration does not change the probability of the base models, whereas
the ‘use-novel’ data does (dis)confirm the base model(s).
Let us consider an example of the above special case. Assume we are comparing
two base models, M ′ and N ′, where these models are defined as per M and N above,
but without the stochastic error terms. Assume too that each of the model-instance
2Note that here we are taking Worrall quite literally in his characterisation of ‘use-novelty’ and
‘double-counting’. For instance, Worrall (2014, p. 55) states that ‘what matters is whether or not
the evidence was used in the construction of the theory (or rather the particular version of the
theoretical framework/programme that entails it)’.
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hypotheses, whether they are associated with M ′ or N ′, have equal prior probability.
Given that the two base models correspond to an equal number of model-instance
hypotheses, the base models themselves consequently have equal prior probability.
Now 3 data points suffices to falsify all but one hypothesis for each base model, if
the data is in fact consistent with one hypothesis for each base model. Assume that
3 data points are learnt. For instance, the data points may be (z = 6;x = 1; y = 2),
(z = 8;x = 2; y = 3) and (z = 12;x = 2; y = 4). This suffices for calibrating the base
models, without changing their probabilities. For the data described, the unfalsified
model instance for each base model is then:
M ′ : z(x, y) = −2 · x+ 4 · y + 0
N ′ : z(x, y) = −6
7
· x+ 4
7
· y2 + 44
7
.
Now assume that a fourth data point is learnt: (z = 10;x = 3; y = 4). This ‘use-
novel’ data point is consistent with M ′ but not N ′, so M ′ is maximally confirmed
relative to N ′, which is falsified.
For the special example just described only the ‘use-novel’ data (dis)confirms the
base models. So the data used for calibration is not also used for confirmation. This
is due to the special structure of the prior probability function. Note also that for
the special example the number of parameters plays a key role in the sense that when
there are p free parameters, p data are needed to determine the parameter values and
only the rest of the data (dis)confirms the base models. (This role for the number of
parameters is often emphasised by defenders of the intuitive position, e.g., in Worrall,
2010.) So we can at least say: Bayesian logic accords with the intuitive position for
a restricted set of cases where the prior probability distribution has a special struc-
ture, including a deterministic relationship between hypotheses and evidence. In this
way, one might argue that the intuitive position supports a Bayesian approach to
model selection, in that it reflects Bayesian reasoning, at least for a restricted set of
cases. It follows that the intuitive position should be refined and extended in line
with Bayesian logic.
Note that Schurz (2014) can be understood as offering a refinement of this sort (he
takes a much more charitable view of Worrall’s position, interpreting use-novelty so
that the role Worrall attributes to it is consistent with Bayesian reasoning). Schurz
argues that the examples put forward by Worrall to motivate use-novelty and the
no-double-counting rule are all of the same kind. Namely, these are cases where a
base theory can be ‘successfully fitted’ to every possible set of data points, and hence
fitting to some particular set of data does not raise the probability of the base theory,
as the likelihood for this data is the same as the likelihood for competing possible
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data.3 In these cases, data used for calibration are not use-novel and so cannot con-
firm. In other cases, however, where a base theory would not be equally well fitted
to any possible data, the relative success of the fit at hand may (dis)confirm the base
theory.4 Schurz effectively refines the notion of ‘use-novelty’, such that in the cases
where, by Bayesian reasoning, a base theory is (dis)confirmed by its fit with the data,
use-novelty is respected, and thus the ‘spread of confirmation’ does not amount to
double-counting. As Schurz puts it, use-novel data bears on that part of the content
of the base theory that transcends or goes beyond the data itself.
We see in the next section that Classical hypothesis-testing has similar implica-
tions to the Bayesian approach with respect to use-novelty and double-counting (at
least on our interpretation of these terms), so this method arguably has just as much
claim to clarifying and reforming the intuitive position. Later we consider rather
different readings of the intuitive position, and what it purportedly gets right about
model selection.
4 Classical tests vis-a`-vis intuitions
Classical statistics offers various methods for assessing the reliability of model predic-
tions. The simplest of these is arguably the standard hypothesis-testing method, our
focus in this section. Like the Bayesian approach to model calibration and prediction,
Classical hypothesis testing involves the enumeration of all plausible model-instance
hypotheses associated with a base model. Generally, only one base model is consid-
ered, although this includes any nested base models (as these are just subsets of the
full set of model-instance hypotheses, restricted to those with common zero-valued
parameters). Also in common with the Bayesian approach, calibration is not distinct
from inference; calibration is just ordinary hypothesis testing, but for a specific kind
of hypothesis, namely the set of model-instance hypotheses associated with a base
model.
Classical hypothesis testing differs from the Bayesian approach in that confidence
in the predictions entailed by a model-instance hypothesis is not grounded in con-
fidence or support for the hypothesis per se, but rather depends on confidence in
3We take it that Schurz means by ‘successfully fitted’ that the distribution of likelihoods for the
various instances of the base theory as well as the corresponding distribution of prior plausibility
for the instances, conditional on the truth of the base theory, are the same for all possible data sets.
Only in this case does it follow that the likelihoods of all possible data with respect to some base
theory are equal.
4Strictly speaking, whether there is (dis)confirmation of the base theory depends on how the
likelihood for the theory compares with that of other base theories.
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the long-run properties of the testing procedure that is used to discriminate the hy-
potheses on the basis of the data (with sample-size n). The typical procedure is as
follows: all model-instance hypotheses for which the n data at hand is too unlikely
are rejected, leaving some subset of model-instance hypothesis that have not been
rejected. These remaining accepted hypotheses (under normal conditions, a convex
set), effectively form a confidence interval of plausible parameter values for the base
model. The long-run properties of the testing procedure that are of interest are the
type I errors for rejecting hypotheses, and the corresponding confidence level for the
set of accepted hypotheses. The type I error is the (long-run frequentist) probability
of rejecting any given model-instance hypothesis when it is in fact true; it matches
the probability that is used as the cutoff for rejection (referred to as the significance
level, typically 0.05 or 0.01).5 The confidence level is the flip-side of the type I error/
significance level; the two values add to 1. The confidence level gives the (long-run
frequentist) probability that the set of accepted model hypotheses, or in other words,
the confidence interval for the various parameter values, contains the true hypothe-
sis/parameter values, if the same experiment (with n data generated by Nature) were
repeated indefinitely. The assumption here is that the set of hypotheses under con-
sideration form a suitable continuum and the true hypothesis is indeed amongst them.
By way of illustration, assume that we need to make well supported model pre-
dictions on the basis of model M , defined as in the previous section:
M : z(x, y) = a · x+ b · y + c+N(0, σ).
Assume here that a and b are unknown, but c and σ have fixed values; so there
are only two free parameters. For the hypothesis-testing method, a continuous set of
model-instance hypotheses is appropriate, effectively treating the unknown param-
eter values as unbounded reals. As before, each of the model-instance hypotheses
of M claims to give the value of z that would be observed in the real world, or
rather a probability distribution for z. Note that, in the course of testing base model
M , two simpler nested base models are also implicitly under consideration. These are:
Mx : z(x, y) = a · x+ c+N(0, σ)
My : z(x, y) = b · y + c+N(0, σ).
Given the observed n data-points, the hypothesis-testing method proceeds as fol-
lows: A significance level is selected, say 0.05. The model-instance hypotheses that
5To be more precise, a model-instance hypothesis is rejected if the data lies in the rejection
region for the hypothesis, where this region includes the most extreme (roughly, furthest away) data
relative to the hypothesis that together have a likelihood equivalent to the significance level.
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would not be rejected, given the data and the nominated significance level, are then
identified. The structure of the hypothesis space and error term here are such that
this will yield a convex set of model-instance hypotheses, or rather, convex confidence
intervals for the values of the two parameters a and b, and ultimately for values of
z(x, y). The confidence intervals that are derived in this way are justified in the sense
that, were this procedure implemented indefinitely (for different n data-points ran-
domly generated by Nature), the confidence interval of accepted hypotheses would
contain the true hypothesis in 95% of cases (assuming that the true data-generating
process is indeed described by some instance of base model M).
Let us reflect now on the question of use-novelty and double-counting. The anal-
ysis is similar in many respects to that in Section 3 above. Calibration just is the
process of rejecting/accepting hypotheses, so it involves the confirmation of model-
instance hypotheses. Moreover, in the process of calibration, one base model may
be confirmed relative to an otherwise nested base model.6 For instance, assume that
for model M above, hypothesis testing against the data yields 95% confidence in-
tervals for parameters a and b, where neither of these intervals contain zero. This
effectively confirms the base model M (with non-zero parameters a and b) relative
to the otherwise nested simpler models Mx and My (for which a or b, respectively,
equals zero). Thus, although the logic of confirmation is different, the importance of
use-novel data in Classical hypothesis testing is as per the Bayesian method, namely,
it is not a relevant consideration. Moreover, as just illustrated, the same data that is
used for calibration may also confirm one base model relative to another one, contrary
to the no-double-counting rule.
Contrary to our comments here, one might argue that Worrall’s maxims are either
upheld, or else are inapplicable, in the case of comparing only nested base models,
as per Classical hypothesis testing. There is, of course, a sense in which the fully
inclusive base model, here M , can neither be confirmed nor disconfirmed by any data
used for calibration, because M is assumed to be true. So calibration does not involve
a ‘spread’ of confirmation to M ; only specific instances of M (or, as we put it, sets
of these instances of M , i.e. the nested base models) can be (dis)confirmed relative
to other (sets of) specific instances of M . This is, however, hardly a strong vindica-
tion of Worrall’s use-novelty and double-counting maxims: the maxims are trivially
upheld by Classical hypothesis testing if we are interested in the (dis)confirmation
of the fully inclusive base model, because the method does not have the resources
for assessing this particular base model. Schurz (2014) would presumably take a
different tack, arguing that the question of use-novelty is inapplicable in the case of
6Here it is really the case that the base model subtract the nested model is (dis)confirmed relative
to the nested model.
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hypothesis testing because it is not the case that the competing base models can all
be successfully fitted to any possible data set. Indeed, in our example above, the
simpler base models do not successfully fit the data. Note, however, that a lot hangs
here on what is understood by a ‘successful fit’; it is in fact a consequence and not an
assumption of hypothesis testing that the simpler base models do not ‘successfully
fit’ the data in our example and so are disconfirmed by this data relative to M with
non-zero parameters a and b. (After all, the data is not logically inconsistent with
the simpler base models.) Our own view is that the lack of ‘successful fit’ for these
simpler base models is another way of saying that these base models are disconfirmed
in the process of calibration, contrary to the intuitive position.
Finally, we note that Mayo (see, for instance, 1991, 2014) also casts doubt on the
significance of use-novelty for Classical or ‘error’ statistics. Mayo argues that what
matters, in determining whether good fit with data has confirmatory power, is not
use-novelty or double-counting per se, but rather whether the procedure for fitting
the base theory to evidence (‘the use-constructed procedure’) violates the severity
requirement. She claims that severity is often violated in the case of use-construction,
but it is not always violated, as in the construction of confidence intervals described
above. Mayo arguably talks past Worrall to some extent in that she is not concerned
with incremental confirmation of one base theory relative to another competing base
theory; furthermore, it is not clear whether her severity requirement succeeds in
discriminating the cases that she intends (this is queried in Hitchcock and Sober
2004, with responses from Mayo in her 2008 and 2014 papers). In any case, we agree
with Mayo that use-novelty does not play a primary role in Classical statistics and
that there are good procedures by Classical standards that involve double-counting.
5 Classical model-selection methods vis-a`-vis in-
tuitions
5.1 Introducing Classical Model-Selection Methods
We now turn to Classical model-selection methods, in particular to cross-validation
and the Akaike Information Criterion selected for their differing approaches to use-
novelty and its relation to double-counting. Let us first consider what the Classical
model-selection methods have in common, and how they are distinct from the meth-
ods described in Sections 3 and 4 above.
All model-selection methods (interpreted broadly to include both Bayesian and
Classical methods) are in the business of assessing the reliability of model predic-
tions, not least, whether the predictions of one model are better supported by the
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data at hand than those of another model. We have already noted the difference
between the Bayesian method and Classical hypothesis testing: While both focus on
the model-instance hypotheses associated with base models, the former is concerned
with assessing the truth of these hypotheses in light of the data while the latter
is concerned with whether the procedure for selecting some hypotheses over others
on the basis of the data is reliable in the long-run. The Classical model-selection
methods introduced in this section are also concerned with procedures for making
model predictions, and the long-run properties of these procedures. This is the hall-
mark of the Classical approach. Unlike hypothesis testing, however, the procedures
canvased here do not assume the truth of any particular base model (where nested
base models are also of interest). That is rather the problem to be addressed. The
whole point of these model-selection methods is to provide a comparative assessment
of different base-model procedures for deriving model predictions on the basis of data.7
The base-model procedures themselves are in a sense simpler than for hypothesis-
testing. Rather than identifying a confidence interval of ‘accepted’ model-instance
hypotheses (premised on the base-model being true), the procedure is rather to iden-
tify the single model-instance hypothesis that has ‘best fit’ with the data (makes the
data most probable); this is referred to as the maximum-likelihood instance of the
base model. Note that, as per hypothesis-testing, the sample size, or the amount of
data used for selecting the maximum-likelihood model (n) is also part of the specifi-
cation of the procedure. The base-model procedures in effect amount to calibrating
the base model such that it can be used for making predictions.
The reliability of a particular ‘base-model procedure’, thus described, is taken to
be its long-run average predictive accuracy, or the average distance from the truth,
if repeated infinitely many times, of a prediction derived from the procedure given
n random data points generated by Nature. The problem, of course, is that the
true data-generating process of Nature is unknown, so the scientist cannot simply
calculate which base-model procedure has the best long-run average predictive accu-
racy. The different Classical model-selection methods effectively offer different ways
of estimating this long-run average predictive accuracy of the respective base-model
procedures. We will examine two of these methods. They each assign scores to
base-model procedures, such that they can be ranked in terms of estimated long-run
average predictive accuracy.
7Elsner and Schmertmann (1994) similarly emphasise that Classical model-selection methods
assess procedures for identifying a model instance for prediction rather than the model instances
themselves. Using their terminology, the targets for confirmation are ‘algorithms’ rather than ‘base-
model procedures’.
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Before we do so, let us mention that Hitchcock and Sober (2004) also discuss
model-selection theory. They consider various ways scientists might assess/confirm
models, some involving novel or predicted data and others just accommodated data;
although some model assessments relying on accommodated data are inferior to as-
sessments involving predicted data, the use of accommodated data may even be ad-
vantageous if the danger of over-fitting models to data is otherwise accounted for (as
per some model selection methods). The focus of this paper is somewhat different, in
that we consider a range of prominent logics of confirmation, focussing rather on the
roles that use-novelty and double-counting play. We do not presume, and indeed we
do not think it obvious, that one or more of these logics of confirmation is superior
to others. Note further that there is a philosophical debate regarding the scope and
completeness of estimators of predictive accuracy proposed in model-selection theory,
such as those we discuss below (e.g., Forster 2007; Myrvold and Harper 2002). The
issue of scope is that model-selection theory is defensible only to the extent that
Nature (at least the part of interest) is effectively a stationary data generation mech-
anism, such that all data, existing and prospective, is independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.). The issue of completeness concerns the extent to which any single
estimator of predictive accuracy assesses what some think really matters, i.e., the
extent the data agrees on the value of causally-relevant parameters. For instance,
Forster (2007) argues that the methods from Classical model selection theory are
incomplete indicators of empirical success and predictive accuracy; instead, empirical
success and predictive accuracy amount to a hierarchical structure that emerges from
the agreement of independent measurements of theoretically postulated quantities.
Here we set these further debates aside. We simply explore what role use-novelty
and double-counting play if one takes Classical model-selection theory as providing
a good measure of predictive success and confirmation (many think that, at least in
certain situations, this is the case).
5.2 Two Cases
Case I
First, consider the method of cross-validation: The standard calibrating procedure
as described above is followed for all base models under consideration. That is, for
each base model, the best fitting model instance given all n data is identified, and
the parameter(s) corresponding to this model instance is(are) then presented as the
best estimate(s) of the free parameter(s) for the base model in question.
The cross-validation estimator for the reliability of each base-model procedure
(i.e. each calibrated base model) is as follows: Given n data points, one starts by
using the first n− 1 data points to arrive at the best-fitting model instance and then
uses the remaining data point to test the performance of the model instance (by cal-
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culating the distance between the predicted data point and the actual data point).
This is repeated for all possible selections of n−1 data points to calculate the average
distance between the predicted data points and the actual data points (with some
distance measure such as the squared distance or the Kullback-Leibler discrepancy).
This average distance is an asymptotically unbiased estimator of the predictive ac-
curacy of the base-model procedure given n data points (Linhard and Zucchini 1984;
Zucchini 2000). Cross-validation is a universal method because it only assumes that
data are independently and identically distributed (cf. Arlot and Celisse 2010).
Here is a simple example. Consider the Euclidean distance as a distance measure
and the base models already discussed in the previous subsection:
M : z(x, y) = a · x+ b · y + c+N(0, σ)
Mx : z(x, y) = a · x+ c+N(0, σ).
Suppose the six data points of (x, y, z(x, y)) are (0, 0, 10), (100, 0, 199), (0, 100, 10),
(100, 100, 210), (200, 100, 410), (100, 200, 199)). For base model M one starts by us-
ing the first 5 data points to arrive at the best-fitting model instance given these 5
data points, which is 1.96x + 0.12y + 2. Then one uses the remaining data point
(100, 200, 199) to test the performance of the model instance by determining the dis-
tance between the predicted value 222 and the actual value 199, i.e. 23. This is
repeated for all six selections of n − 1 data points. The six differences are then av-
eraged giving (32 + 26.6667 + 8.8889 + 10.4348 + 27.8261 + 8)/6 = 18.9694. Thus
18.9694 is the cross-validation estimator of the predictive accuracy of M given six
data points.8 Then one turns to base model Mx. The average of the six differences
for model Mx is: (8 + 15.7143 + 8 + 8.5714 + 26.6667 + 15.7143)/6 = 13.7778. Thus
13.7778 is the estimator of the predictive accuracy of Mx given six data points. Since
13.7778 is smaller than 18.9694, the maximum-likelihood procedure for base model
Mx is confirmed relative to that for M . The maximum-likelihood instance of Mx is
identified, or in other words, the best fitting values of the parameters for Mx given all
6 data are identified, which are a = 1.97647 and c = 5.29412. Note that this example
is especially interesting because it shows that while, clearly, M has a better fit to the
data than Mx (because Mx is a nested model of M), Mx nevertheless scores better in
terms of expected predicted accuracy. Note that, as already mentioned above, it is
just an accidental feature of the base models Mx and My that they are nested base
models. The methods of model selection work for any arbitrary comparison between
base models, whether they are nested or not.9
8To be precise, 17.969 is the estimate of the predictive accuracy of the M -procedure, where this
procedure amounts to finding the maximum-likelihood instance of M based on 6 data points.
9For instance, one could equally compare the performance of base models M and N of Section
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For a method such as cross-validation it is crucial that, when estimating predictive
accuracy, the data used to test the predictions of model instances are novel. This
is also emphasised by Hitchcock and Sober (2004) and expressed by the following
quotes on cross-validation (which are made in the context of discussing statistical
bias):
The results of these experiments using cross-validation reinforce the point
that knowledge gained from the model building dataset is biased (Michaelsen
1987, 1598).
An example of controlled division is provided by the cautious statistician
who sets aside a randomly selected part of his sample without looking
at it and then plays without inhibition on what is left, confident in the
knowledge that the set-aside data will deliver an unbiased judgment on
the efficacy of his analysis (Stone 1974, 111).
Hence here use-novelty is important, just as proponents of the intuitive position
would argue. However, recall that, for the base-model procedure, all the data are
used for calibration to find the best model instance. Hence cross-validation involves
double-counting. So we see that what we find for methods such as cross-validation is
different and more nuanced than the intuitive position: use-novelty is important but
at the same time there is double-counting. Hence, contrary to the intuitive position,
use-novelty does not imply the ‘no-double-counting rule’, which says that data used
in calibrating a model cannot also play a role in confirming the predictions of the
model. Despite this divergence, one might contend that cross-validation captures
the spirit of the intuitive position, in that it gives significance to use-novelty when
it comes to the confirmation of base models, and furthermore, the calibration step
itself, where all the data is used to determine the best model instance, has no bearing
on the confirmation of the base models. This could be said to accord with Worrall’s
remarks on conditional versus unconditional confirmation, the latter of which requires
use-novelty. Thus one might argue that the intuitive position should be refined in
keeping with cross-validation.
Notice that what we have called cross-validation is often also called n − 1-cross-
validation to emphasise that one data point is used to test the predictive accuracy
of the procedure. There is also n− k-cross-validation, where k data points are used
to test the predictive accuracy of the procedure (and, again, as a final step all n
data are used for calibration). It is important to realise that these methods lead
to biased estimates because one tests the performance of the base-model procedure
3 (which are not nested).
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when n − k data points are used for calibration and not what one would really like
to test: namely, the performance of the procedure when n data points are used for
calibration (as is actually done). There is least bias for n − 1-cross-validation, and,
as mentioned above, this method yields an asymptotically unbiased estimate (Arlot
and Celisse 2010; Zucchini 2000). Some have suggested using only half of the data
for calibration and the rest for confirmation, or using only p data for calibration
(where p is the number of free parameters) and the rest for confirmation (cf. Oreskes
et al. 1994; Worrall 2010). Such methods indeed yield unbiased estimators of the
predictive accuracy of base-model procedures that use n/2 or p data points for cali-
bration (Linhard and Zucchini 1984; Zucchini 2000). However, this is not in line with
model-selection theory, where the maxim is to use all the data to estimate the most
plausible value of the free parameters and hence to evaluate the predictive accuracy
of the base-model procedure when all data are used for calibration (because one does
not want to throw away any information about the parameters).
Case II
The Akaike Information Criterion for finite sample sizes measures the distance be-
tween the simulated and actual observations in terms of the Kullback-Leibler discrep-
ancy.10 Here again the base-model procedures under consideration are the standard
variety: the best-fitting model instance for each base model relative to the n data
points is identified. This is the calibrated base model that would be used for predic-
tion.
By way of estimating the long-run average predictive accuracy of the aforesaid
procedure for each base model, one first calculates the discrepancy between the
maximum-likelihood model instance and the actual data points. This discrepancy
amounts to − ln[L]
n
, where L is the maximum value of the likelihood function (Zucchini
2000, 52-53). This is then used to calculate the confirmation score of the procedure
given n data points as follows:
CAICc = − ln[L]
n
+ (
p
n
+
p(p+ 1)
n(n− p− 1)), (3)
where p is the number of free parameters. It can be shown that CAICc is an unbiased
estimator of the discrepancy between the true data generation mechanism and the
base-model procedure, i.e. the average predictive accuracy of the base-model proce-
dure (Burnham and Anderson 1998; Linhard and Zucchini 1984). For CAICc the data
also have to be independently and identically distributed (and there are some fur-
ther technical assumptions; see Burnham and Anderson 1998; Linhard and Zucchini,
1986).
10Our conceptual points also hold for other distance measures.
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Let us illustrate the Akaike Information Criterion with the simple base-models
M and Mx above. It can be shown that for normally distributed error terms with a
constant variance, CAICc can be easily computed:
CAICc =
ln[2piσˆ2] + 1
2
+ (
p
n
+
p(p+ 1)
n(n− p− 1)) (4)
where σˆ2 =
∑n
i=1 ˆ
2
i /n, with ˆi being the estimated residuals in a linear regression
with the Euclidean distance measure (Burnham and Anderson 1998, 63). Starting
with M , one first determines the best model instance given all data points, which is
1.98182x− 0.0181818y + 6.36364. Then one calculates the sum of the squared resid-
uals and divides it by 6, which amounts to (3.63642 + 14.54552 + 5.45462 + 7.27272 +
9.09092 + 10.90912)/6 = 84.8488. By plugging this into equation (4), one obtains
(p = 3 because the estimated parameters are a, b, c): (ln[2pi84.8488] + 1)/2 + 3/6 +
(3 ∗ 4)/(6(6 − 3 − 1)) = 5.13937, which is the expected predictive accuracy for the
maximum-likelihood instance of M given six data points. Then the same is repeated
for Mx. That is, one determines the best model instance given all data points, which is
1.987647x+5.29412, and calculates the sum of the squared residuals and divides it by
6, which is (4.70592 +12.94122 +4.70592 +7.05882 +9.41182 +12.94122)/6 = 86.2748.
From equation (4) one obtains (p = 2 because the parameters that are estimated are
a and c): (ln[2pi86.2748] + 1)/2 + 2/6 + (2 ∗ 3)/(6(6 − 2 − 1)) = 4.31437, which is
the expected predictive accuracy for the maximum-likelihood instance of Mx given
six data points. Since 4.31437 is smaller than 5.13937, Mx is confirmed over M and
the best estimates for the parameter values of Mx are a = 1.987647 and c = 5.29412.
Note that again Mx is confirmed over M , even though M has a better fit with the
data than Mx (because Mx is a nested model of M).
Clearly, for methods such as AICc there is double-counting because all the data
are used to estimate the value of the free parameters (the base-model calibrating
procedure) and also to calculate the confirmation score (3). Further, the data used
for confirmation are not use-novel because the maximum likelihood given all the data
is a key term in the confirmation expression; unlike cross-validation, there is no ap-
parent assessment of how the base-model procedure fares on new data. Still, in a
precise sense there is a penalty term in the expression for the degree of confirmation
because the data have already been used for calibration.
To show this, let us compare two methods for evaluating the predictive accuracy
of base-model procedures that use n data for calibration and only differ because (i)
in the first case the data used for confirmation are use-novel and (ii) in the second
case they are not (where we work with the Kullback-Leiber divergence as distance
19
measure). In case of (i), one starts by using n data for calibration to find the model
instance that fits the data best. Then one goes on to use other novel n data points to
calculate the distance between the predicted and actual data points to estimate the
predictive accuracy of the procedure (the reason for choosing n data points is that we
later want to compare this method with the Akaike Information Criterion for finite
sample sizes, which also uses n data points for confirmation).11 One can show that
this estimator is unbiased (Linhard and Zucchini 1984; Zucchini 2000).
Let us now turn to (ii) and AICc. One starts as in (i) and uses n data points for
calibration to find the best model instance. But now one does not test the perfor-
mance of the model instance with novel data points but with the same n data points
that have been used for calibration. With these data points one does exactly what
has been done in (i) and calculates the average Kullback-Leibler divergence between
the best fitting model instance and the n data points. What one obtains is the term
on the left hand side of CAICc (equation 3). What has been done so far is exactly as
in (i), with the only difference that the data used are not use-novel. But the term
on the left hand side of CAICc is not enough – using just this term would lead to
an estimate that is statistically very biased. Intuitively speaking, the estimate based
on maximum-likelihood fit is a bit optimistic because the good fit of the best-fitting
model is specific to the data at hand, rather than to a new piece of data and hence
the procedure is statistically biased (tending to overestimate predictive accuracy in
the long-run). So in order to get an unbiased estimator of the predictive accuracy
of the procedure when n data are used for calibration, we also need the term on the
right hand side of CAICc. Hence this term on the right hand side can be interpreted
as a penalty term because the data have already been used before for calibration. Be-
cause of this penalty term, use-novelty still plays a certain role (but one that is more
nuanced than the role it plays in the standard intuitive account).12 Thus the AIC
method could also be argued to be an apt refinement of the intuitive position in that
use-novelty matters for comparing base models.
Finally, recall that defenders of the intuitive position often emphasise the cru-
cial role of the number of parameters p. For the second case (ii), the number of
parameters also plays a role but it is different to the one advocated by the intuitive
position. According to the intuitive position, the number of parameters p is crucial
because it tells one that p data points should be used for calibration and the rest for
11The method would also yield an unbiased estimate of predictive accuracy of the procedure if
one used any other finite number of novel data points. The more data points, the better, in the
sense that the more data points are used, the smaller will be the variance of the estimator.
12Note that Hitchcock and Sober (2004) also point out that for CAICc use-novelty (or rather
double-counting) is not a relevant consideration, but our claim about the penalty term is novel and
has not been made by them.
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confirmation. In contrast to this, in model-selection theory always all data should
be used for calibration. Still, for case (ii) and methods such as AICc the number of
parameters plays a role in the sense that the penalty term ( p
n
+ p(p+1)
n(n−p−1)) depends on
the number of parameters of the procedure.
There is an important connection between cross-validation and the Akaike Infor-
mation Criterion. Namely, it can be shown that the (n−1)-cross-validation estimator
is asymptotically equivalent to the Akaike Information criterion, i.e. their estimates
of the predictive ability of models coincides approximately as n goes to infinity (Stone
1977). Therefore, in some sense, use-novelty is also implicitly contained in the Akaike-
Information Criterion. Our discussion can make sense of this in the following way:
while for cross-validation use-novelty is an important requirement, for the Akaike-
Information Criterion use-novelty also plays some role in the sense that there is a
penalty term for the Akaike Information Criterion because the data have already
been used before for calibration.
6 Re-examining our case study
Let us now re-examine our case study in light of the discussion of the previous sec-
tions and ask whether Willet et al. proceed according to any of the four approaches
discussed in this paper. A closer look reveals that they follow the framework of Clas-
sical tests as outlined in Section 4. Recall that for base model M1 there are two free
parameters – one that measures the extent of the response to the anthropocentric
forcings and one that measures the extent of the response to the natural forcings.
For base model M2 there is only one free parameter – that measures the extent of the
response to the natural forcings (the unknown parameter values are treated as taking
on some value in the reals). Willet et al. first consider base-model M1 and use the
data about surface specific humidity to identify the model-instance hypotheses that
would not be rejected, given the significance level of 0.05. In this way, they arrive
at confidence intervals for the anthropogenic forcing and natural forcing respectively.
Given that neither interval contains the value zero, this effectively confirms the base
model M1 (with positive values for both free parameters) relative to the nested sim-
pler base model M2 (for which the anthropocentric forcing would be zero). As is the
case for Classical tests, for Willet et al. use-novelty is not a relevant consideration
and the same data are used both for calibration and for confirmation of base model
M1 relative to M2.
13
13Again, note that really M1 subtract M2 is confirmed relative to M2.
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While Willet et al. appeal to a Classical and not a Bayesian framework, their
procedure nevertheless could be roughly reconstructed in Bayesian terms as follows.
Let the uncertainty about the forcing values be represented by some prior probability
distribution over the possible forcing values conditional on base-model hypothesis M1,
say, a uniform distribution over the possible forcing values. This prior will also in-
corporate instances of the nested base model M2. For a uniform prior, the posterior
probability distribution over model-instance hypotheses (the result of calibration)
will mirror the relative likelihoods of these model instances. Here the relative likeli-
hoods depend on fit with data E about changes in surface specific humidity. Willet
et al. find that the best-fitting forcing values for M1 are (1.12, 2.22). In effect, this
model-instance hypothesis has highest posterior probability under a uniform prior.
Moreover, given the Classical 95% confidence intervals, we know that instances of the
nested base model M2 are not amongst the model instances that have best fit with
the data, or highest posterior probability on the assumption of a uniform distribu-
tion. Indeed, it is plausible that the likelihood ratio for base-model hypothesis M1
relative to the nested hypothesis M2 is greater than one. So we see that the Bayesian
reconstruction of Willet et al.’s logic yields the same conclusion vis-a`-vis the intuitive
position, namely, in contrast to this position, all the data are used for both confirma-
tion and calibration and the data used for confirmation are not use-novel.
Willet et al. subscribe to the Classical framework of hypothesis testing outlined
above, which is different from the framework of Classical model-selection theory. Both
frameworks demand double-counting, since all data must be used for calibration. But
of course use-novelty only plays a role in the latter framework. Willet et al. do not
use any method such as cross-validation where use-novelty plays a role, nor a method
such as AICc where there is some penalty term because the data have already been
used for calibration or, more generally, where it is somehow taken into consideration
that it is easier for model M1 to provide a good fit with the data than for the nested
model M2. Instead Willet et al. simply use all the data for calibration and confir-
mation and use-novelty plays no role for them. Hence their view on double-counting
and use-novelty is not the more nuanced view presented by Classical model-selection
theory.
Let us briefly explain how the analysis would go if a model-selection method such
as cross-validation were used. First, one would consider model M1 and use the first
n − 1 data points to determine the best-fitting model instance of M1, and then use
the remaining data point to calculate the distance between the predicted and actual
data point. This would need to be repeated for all possible selections of n − 1 data
points to calculate the average distance between the predicted and the actual data
points for model M1 (with some distance measure such as the squared distance or
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the Kullback-Leibler discrepancy). Exactly the same would need to be repeated for
model M2 to calculate the average distance between the predicted and actual data
points for model M2. Then one would compare the average distance between pre-
dicted and actual data points for M1 and M2, and the model procedure with the lower
score would be confirmed relative to the model procedure with the higher score. It is
not entirely clear what the model procedure with the lower score would be; one would
need to do the calculations to know for sure. Yet it seems likely that the model with
the lower score will still be M1 because the number of data is very large, M1 has only
one additional parameter when compared to M2 and all model instances of M2 have
a bad fit with the data (while there are model instances of M1 that fit to the data
well). Assuming that M1 indeed is confirmed over M2, as a final step all the data
points would be used for calibration to obtain the parameter values that correspond
to the best fitting model instance of M1; the values obtained in this way would be
(1.12, 2.22) (as in Willet et al.).
To conclude, Willet et al. adopt the Classical framework of hypothesis testing,
where use-novelty is not a relevant consideration and double-counting is legitimate.
Hence their view is not in line with the intuitive position, which argues for use-novelty
and against double-counting, and also not with the more nuanced account presented
by model-selection theory. While Willet et al. also do not adopt a Bayesian frame-
work, their views on use-novelty and double-counting coincide with the Bayesian
position, where double-counting is proper and use-novelty is not a relevant consider-
ation.
In general, when climate scientists worry about the legitimacy of double-counting
and whether data should be use-novel, an important insight from our discussion is
that an answer to these worries depends on the confirmatory framework. In this
paper we have considered three major confirmation frameworks: In the Bayesian
framework and the Classical testing framework double-counting is proper and use-
novelty is besides the point. In Classical model-selection theory double-counting is
also proper, but the role of use-novelty is more nuanced. Either data are required
to be use-novel or there is a penalty term because the data have already been used
for calibration before. Hence if climate scientists worry about double-counting and
use-novelty, they should carefully think about which confirmation framework they
would like to adopt. This in turn will then lead them to certain conclusions about
double-counting and use-novelty.
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7 Conclusion
Where does all this leave the general dilemma from which we started? We noted
at the outset that in prominent examples from the history of science, use-novel as
opposed to accommodated data intuitively provide more compelling support for the
reliability of a theory. The puzzle is how to explain these intuitions about use-novelty
and confirmation such that other deeply held intuitions/principles concerning con-
firmation are also respected. To this end, Worrall makes an important conceptual
move: He equates accommodating data to settling on a refined version of a general
theory, or, in more technical language, to calibrating the free parameters of a base
theory or model. We have seen, however, that the intuitive position Worrall endorses
regarding use-novelty and double-counting with respect to the calibration of free pa-
rameters is not in fact a widespread truth that is common to all the major logics of
confirmation.
Indeed, none of the prominent logics of confirmation endorse the intuitive posi-
tion in full, i.e. that use-novel data is not just special for confirmation, in fact only
data not used for calibration can confirm a general theory. The troubles arise for
stochastic theories or models, which are, moreover, widespread in scientific practice,
as illustrated by our example from climate science. The question then arises as to
which confirmatory framework best underpins and advances the intuitive position.
We showed that the Bayesian or Classical hypothesis-testing framework does capture
a certain simplicity in the intuitive position that holds for special deterministic cases:
use-novel data is identified as data not used for calibration, and only this data can
(dis)confirm a base model/theory. The so-called Classical model-selection methods
instead respect the intuitive position in a different way: use-novelty has a special role
to play in confirmation, or in assessing the reliability of model predictions, but use-
novel data cannot simply be identified as data not used in calibration. We are thus
left with a quandary. How it is resolved will depend on one’s broader commitments
regarding the distinguishing properties of the various logics of confirmation.
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